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MGK-H-29 January 1952 Chief of Station, Frankfurt Mtn: 0505 Chief, SR Chlor, EE REDSOX/AERODINALLC/OFERATIONAL on 11 January 1952 Documents Obtained by from CASSOWARY 2 for Transmittal to CASSOWARY 3. The following attachments are being forwarded for CSOB's interest and retentions 1. Letter from CASSOWARY 2 to CASSOWARY 3. 2. CASSOWARY 2's Thoughts and Observations Regarding Contact attachment to letter to CASSOWARY 3. 3. Photostate of originals of Items 1 and 2. BECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3028 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT BATE 2007 Attachments - 4

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25 December 1951

Dear Doctor:

I have decided to send a letter to you in this manner in order to clarify those questions about which it is difficult to write in an ordinary letter. I am also including my "thoughts and observations" which I have caught on paper. In them I do not analyse single or particular questions but give only a skeleton outline.

As I have mentioned in the past, at present - particularly in the technical liaison field of cooperation - I do not have a full picture and because of this it is difficult for me to express myself fully. That is why I suggested that you, over there, would think these matters over fully because of the lack of information and not being in the course of events I might give an evaluation.

From your last letter and the former conversation I had, I have got the impression that you have jointly accepted a somewhat changed plan and you will probably try to realise it. I met here with him in order to suggest finding people in this area of whom some would go for schooling, others for support forces, etc. In order that I might take a stand and give an answer then I must have either a directive or an agreement from you or a clear picture of the entire structure from those who came to me after reaching an agreement with you. Otherwise, I refuse this type of function now and in the future-moreover, since past experience shows that every project or plan in its realization completely less its original propositions.

Here is an example. We had agreed upon the matter of the UPA veterans who are in this area who will be mobilized into an arm in the very near future. According to the agreement I gave a list of those people and later tried in three cases to intervene before men were sent to Korea or to other areas. The results have been completely fruitless and I can deduce that the lists which I have sent will be used by them for an entirely different purpose. Naturally, it cannot be expected that anyone would agree to have himself put on a list, and I refuse to do this. After all, the reasons would have to be explained to the people. Therefore, I feel that the people should be taid the truth and that is that the ZP or the Misia has little intention, in the light of the present political situation, to be engaged in any actions when it is impossible to tell how they might end.

It is completely clear to me that, in joint interest, all the veterans of the UPA - and not only they - should not be presently mobilized or sent to the front since tomorrow their services might be far more valuable. If this idea is not understood then it would be better to



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say that we have no possibilities at all regarding mobilization.

The next question is the activisation of information activity. Recently, you have mentioned this matter again. I, however, regard it as unrealistic and am giving my reasons:

- a. In order to carry on any kind of internal or external information service there would be necessary at least three people who would have time for this. In other words, they would have to be free from their regular work that is work to make a living.
- b. For external information work there must be some political agreements or at least an understanding / of our cause by writers and correspondents, and agreement from those who are holding us back new.
- c. Regardless of how small, we still must have steady funds.

None of these prerequisites exist at present. All of us here who work for a living do not do so for the fum of it but from necessity. Work itself, including travel, takes on an average of eleven hours and after this many find it impossible to do anything but sleep. When a factory worker is physically tired then you should not expect miracles of him. You know very well that I tried for more than a year not to work and sent my family to work, but at present my house has become a hospital.

we have turned down your proposal to use our emergency fund on principle and because of practical reasons. The latter are the following: Three people - a minimum of \$300. monthly. Add to this a minimum of \$300. for incidental expenses and you have \$1200. Our fund will last a few months and after this it would be necessary to return to physical labor just after having started. (To find work for some of us - for an example, SHANK - is not an easy matter because of age).

Our current prospects also do not seem too bright. It appears a fact to me that the information about the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people is purposely held back by opinion forming channels. Here there seems to be forming a pro-Kussian orientation and the Ukrainian Liberational movement is branded as "separatist". For an example: About eight months ago Professor Burnham gave an article about the Ukrainian liberation struggle to the <u>Readers Digest</u>. The editors had immediately agreed to print the article but so far it has not appeared. Yesterday I learned that Mr. Witwitsky personally gave a New Year's greeting from the UNR to the VOA for broadcast. Mr. Gregoriev crossed out the greetings to UPA and to the revolutionary underground and changed it to "liberation move or moves" and explained to Mr. Witwitsky that government circles do not permit \(\int \) to mention UPA \(\int \). I could mention a number of examples of this sort.

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I would also like to remind you that the most important news items from the Ukraine, that is, reports of the year 1950, have not been released for informational use although they would be immediately accepted by the press. Why this was done I do not know but I reserve the right to form my own conclusions (instead, for an example, Mr. Kraichovich, who is the leader of the Slovak bureau steadily prints extensive information about their underground, which in fact has little in common with the truth).

I believe that in the event, for example, that someone would give the information that the UPA is fighting for a "Free Russia against the enslavement of the Stalin regime and for the renewal of the brother-hood of all the 'Russian peoples' ", then the press would have a sensational theme for months to come.

In line with this is also the so-called \$100,000,000. fund, Vishinsky's reaction, and Acheson's answer. The fund, in actuality, has been allotted, but now they do not know what to do with it. (Vishinsky was not opposed to the creation of the SONR, etc., but he was against this fund since the use of this fund would have threatened the [USSR] internal security).

So far, we have banked on publication since we felt that the published work is always more valuable and documentary and besides that, there is no expenditure for a bureau and workers, and all there is is just the cost of the printing. Even if the publication caused a deficit it would be easier to collect among ourselves the amount necessary to cover that deficit then to keep up a bureau or a number of people.

Regarding the People, and the Work:

Again I say, please understand that no one here will want to go-on on propaganda promises (which are whispered to us). It is possible to fool one's self and others for a time, but carried any further it would be toying with a very serious matter.

Finally, one more matter. We are carrying on a work and we do not wish it to be "illegal" but want it to be according to the laws here. As the matter stands now, however, even though we are not carrying on any illegal activity we are still not backed by law so that I doubt that if tomorrow someone wanted to carry on an investigation that we would be properly backed. You are acquainted with the matter of formal registration but I might add that the registered person does not even have the right to work physically. Here I am worried in the first place about the fighters of the UPA and their relationship to the mission. Because of the necessity I do not have to motivate them, but I feel it necessary to warn them of the eventual consequences.

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This seems about all, although I realize that this is only touching some questions and superficially at that. I have given them so that you might form a better judgment and reach your own conclusions.

Many of the things which have happened, I regard as illogical since they lack a solid basis (the very fact that there is no direct contact, or even indirect, between us so that important questions could be settled quickly, can be regarded as illogical).

These remarks of mine although possimistic in character, so not stem from possimism but only prove the lack of seriousness in others to the basic problems which tomorrow will show themselves to be extremely costly.

Hearty greetings,

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24 December 1951

Thoughts and Observations Regarding Contact

- A. A direct contact with the Ukraine (on liaison points)
- B. Blind Contact with the Ukraine (our own plan)

Re A: As long as the leadership and the centralization of the struggle of liberation lasts we will make our contacts according to the directives, cues and necessities of the leadership. The only condition regarding this is the understanding that the leaders are answerable for the politics and tactics of the liberation struggle and that at least one or two persons of the leadership are personally known to one of our group. (In the event of any question the renewal or institution of any personal check will have to be done through direct contact there).

As the case states, we must wait until spring for contact from the homeland and the general cues of this contact should be followed. Only in the event that this contact is not renewed would we initiate plan B.

Re B: In our case, this plan would have to be realized indirectly. The first contact cannot be completely blind but on the contrary, after coming there the teams objective would be:

- a. to secure themselves for independent action.
- b. to check as covertly as possible the status of the liberation struggle, its views and methods of action with the help of personal friends who can be trusted and with secure checks on the people with whom they are dealing.

If it is possible to prove the existence of a directing center then the objective of this first group would be the renewal of contact and initiating a mutually acceptable plan (by mutual plan I understand the acceptance of our plan by given factors). In this case the independent action of the given group has ended and it goes under the direction of the leadership.

If, on the other hand, it were proven that the directing center does not exist and the only thing that is left is the lower cells as independent unities, then the group would not unite with any one of them (as long as it constitutes an active unity) and it would initiate the second plan of independent action.

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The next group, after receiving information from the first, would have as its main objective: to establish itself independently and learn about the condition in the area, trying to locate the net as well as individual people in it.

These groups would not have any contact between them but they would be coordinated and would get their instruction by contact Z with the base Z.

Each group, finding the lower calls, would not make itself known in its entirety and would not say where it is from, nor its objective, but would gather, to the best of its ability, information about the area, the possibility of action, about the condition and strength of the net, its value and its security.

(If it is discovered that the membership of the underground is fairly extensive and their fight seems to be domed to gradual liquidation, then it would be better that they be directed in small groups to the west where complete debriefing could take place). The realization of this plan could have success under the following conditions:

Carrying it on under a principle of decentralization, without any fanfare and not on the basis of only one plan - (pattern).

A Short Resume of the Flan of Action in the Event of A or B

I believe that at the present time it is possible to carry on action in either case and that it is necessary to change to the system of decentralisation according to a plan which will be worked out for long range objectives. In the event of B, the coordination of action would be carried on in the emigration and on the inside each group would act as an independent unity. In the event of A (the better one) coordination would be carried on partly on the inside and partly on the outside. As I see it, the members of the directing center should transfer individually, according to plan, into single groups and act independently, having among them a long range system of essential liaison which would have been decided upon proviously and this liaison would be used only in the event that further carrying on of the liberation struggle is threatened.

All groups should break large scale direct contact with the inhabitants of a given area. They should keep contact only on the individual basis with the help of dead drops, not pre-established on a long-time basis.

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They would receive all their technical and material help from the outside. On the inside they would create a closed self-sufficient unity. (Special assignments, contacts, storing of surplus technical or support materials and so forth, should be done on the individual basis).

The area of a group's activity should not be considered as limited, but should overlap a given section of the area which has been set aside for the activity of other groups. As the basis of this plan, the tactics and strategy of action should be changed from that of the present, and, along with this, the burden of those areas which up to this time have been the steady centers of activity, would be lightened.

In the system of contacting individuals, nets should not be built but the entire matter should be done on the individual basis. These people should live legally (the chain should be one which could be broken in every conceivable manner but in such a way that the key personnel would not be compromised).

Aside from the mentioned action system, I envisage another system which I shall call one of long range objectives. This system, also on the individual basis, would be comprised of picked individuals who would conceivably last the longest and each of them would have different assignments in the event of war, internal revolution, or a weakening of the regime. For instance: one would be assigned to organize the UPA at a given time in his area; another would know the place where throw-aways would be hidden; a third would be assigned to organize administration, etc. In this system there also could be people for the renewal of contact with the outside.

I also consider it essential that the given groups should have enough money to buy information if the opportunity presented itself.

Each group would have its own basic assignments and should keep to them and not take upon itself second rate assignments. The groups would have to be briefed to stay at their assignments as long as possible, according to a given scheme, and not to react to incidental actions of the enemy.

I consider impossible even the slightest actions unless there is only one coordinating center on the cutside. Attempts of two or more centers would be doomed to failure and no one would gain by this except the enemy.

Schooling of Groups:

This is a completely different phase which necessitates a very clear



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plan and its full realization. Accepting as a basis the independent action of each group predicates the character and frame of the schooling. As a basis of this schooling lies:

- a. General military training with an addition of partisan tactios.
- b. Technicians.
- c. Reconnaissance-intelligence (security).
- d. Propaganda and printing techniques.

In this framework should also be included trade and professional courses: drivers, medics, and at least a basic knowledge of the Russian language, customs, conditions of living, etc.

The Expediency of Contact, Especially in Plan B

I do not favor fighting for the sake of fighting and especially to renewing this struggle from the emigration without any kind of political concessions. As the matter stands regarding this last point, I would rather favor the liquidation of active resistance rather than emlarging it and even more serious, renewing it. In short, I believe that we need no new sacrifices to the concept of a one-and-indivisible Russia, not to give any sign of our activity, because they will want to force us into this concept and I am quite certain that they will not punish us for our inactivity by separating us from our "great brotherly nation". I am, therefore, in favor of having this "brother nation" show at least an anti-regime struggle since the indivisibility of its fatherland is practically guaranteed.

As matters stand today, I don't believe that any of us in the emigration has the moral right to activate resistance of people in the Ukraine; we have only the right to give any aid for which they ask from there.

Because of this, please consider the thoughts which I have expressed above regarding the question of contact, only in the light of the above condition.

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